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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David R. McDonald appeals from the judgment of conviction entered following
the denial of his motion to suppress and his entry of a conditional guilty plea.

On

appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
because the search conducted pursuant to his probation agreement was not supported
by reasonable suspicion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. McDonald was charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine).

(R., pp.17-18.)

The charge stemmed from a

warrantless search of Mr. McDonald's locked bedroom, conducted by misdemeanor
probation officer Mary Gomez on April 28, 2011, with the assistance of Officer Ibarra of
the Caldwell Police Department.

(R., pp.27-30.)

Mr. McDonald filed a Motion to

Suppress, supported by his affidavit, challenging the legality of the search of his
bedroom under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.24-30.)
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, Michelle McDonald
testified that she is the mother of Mr. McDonald with whom she leased the home at
which the search occurred.

On April 28, 2011, she resided in the home with

Mr. McDonald, his wife Jennifer, and two of Jennifer's minor daughters. (Tr.vol.l,1 pA,

1 Two volumes of transcripts were prepared on appeal. The first, containing transcripts
of the evidentiary hearing held on a motion to suppress and a hearing at which that
motion was argued, will be cited to as "Tr.vol.l." The second, containing transcripts of
the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing, will be cited to as "Tr.vol.ll."
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L.10 - p.5, L.7.)

The house has three bedrooms and a "bonus room."

Each of

Jennifer's two daughters had her own bedroom, Ms. McDonald occupied the master
bedroom, and Mr. McDonald and Jennifer "had converted the bonus room into like their
bedroom." The bonus room had a lock on it similar to those used on bathroom doors
with "one of those little holes in it." (Tr.vol.l, p.5, Ls.8-20.)
At approximately 7 p.m. on April 28, 2011, Mr. McDonald's "probation officer
showed up at the door with a police officer and asked if [Mr. McDonald] was at home."
Ms.

McDonald allowed them entry.

When asked, she showed them where

Mr. McDonald's bedroom was. They tried to open his bedroom door, but were unable to
do so because it was locked.

The probation officer then asked the police officer to

unlock it, to which he replied, "I can't." Ms. McDonald was then asked to unlock the
door, which she did using a barbecue skewer.

(Tr.vol.l, p.6, L.2 - p.8, L.20.) The

probation officer and police officer then entered Mr. McDonald's bedroom. After they'd
been inside the bedroom for a while, the probation officer came out and asked
Ms. McDonald if she could "get ahold of him [Mr. McDonald]."

Ms. McDonald then

called Mr. McDonald, told him that his probation officer and a police officer were there,
and the probation officer talked to him on the phone. They were there for approximately
two hours, during which time Mr. McDonald was never present. Ms. McDonald wasn't
sure whether the bedroom door was locked every day, but that she "respected their
boundaries, so I didn't check their doorknob every day to see if it was locked." She
further testified she never went into their room, but they shared the common areas of
the house, specifically "[t]he living room and the kitchen." (Tr.vol.l, p.8, L.21 - p.12,
L.2.)
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Misdemeanor probation officer Mary Gomez testified that Mr. McDonald was one
of her misdemeanor probationers, and that she had been supervising him since
approximately March 2011 on a drug paraphernalia charge.

Mr. McDonald was

convicted on July 20, 2009, and signed a misdemeanor supervision agreement on July
31, 2009. The judgment of conviction was admitted as State's Exhibit No.1, and the
supervision agreement was admitted as State's Exhibit No.2. A term of the supervision
agreement relevant to the motion to suppress reads as follows: "I will permit officers of
Canyon County Probation Department to search my person, vehicle, residence, or any
other property under my control without a warrant at any time, day or night upon
reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the Agreement of Supervision."
(TrVol.l, p.13, L.8 - p.18, L.13; State's Exhibit No.2.)
Ms. Gomez testified that "[t]here were several factors" that caused her to conduct
an unannounced visit of Mr. McDonald's home that day, namely,
First he was - he had tested positive previously for methamphetamines.e]
He was placed on color call-in for random UAs. And on - on April 20, he
was - I'm sorry. On April 18, he missed - he went in to do a UA at Global
Drug Testing, [during] which they discovered he was trying to falsify his
urine sample by using a device. So after that he was to get enrolled in
treatment. I contacted the treatment facility.[3] He had not done so, so
then at that point I decided to come and pay him a home visit.[4]

The positive samples were provided on January 26 and February 1. Between
February 1 and April 18, Mr. McDonald participated in one other UA, on March 1, which
came back "clean." (Tr.vol.l, p.23, L.13 - p.24, L.11.)
3 Ms. Gomez later testified that on March 1, 2011, she ordered Mr. McDonald to enroll in
a cognitive self-change class administered by the probation department, which was to
begin on March 9, 2011. After she discovered that he had failed to attend the class, she
ordered him to enroll with Bell Counseling. On April 15, 2011, she learned that he was
not in treatment at Bell Counseling. (Tr.vol.l, p.25, L.3 - p.27, L.9.)
4 Ms. Gomez later testified that the home visit was conducted during her regular
monthly ride-along with the Caldwell Police Department because "Mr. McDonald was on
the list [of her probationers]." (TrVol.I, p.28, Ls.2-16.)
2

3

(Tr.Vol.I, p.1B, L.14 - p.19, L.14.) Ms. Gomez had last had contact with Mr. McDonald
when she met with him on April 13, 200B. (TrVol.I, p.24, Ls.12-17.)
When she arrived at Mr. McDonald's home, she advised Ms. McDonald she was
there to conduct a home visit and "[t]old her to ... show me to his room."

She

discovered that the door was locked, at which point Ms. McDonald "mentioned that he
always locked it."

After Ms. Gomez looked at Officer Ibarra, he said "she

[Ms. McDonald] would have to be the one to unlock it if we needed in." At that point,
Ms. McDonald retrieved an item from the kitchen and used it to unlock the door.
Ms. Gomez then entered the bedroom, asked for Officer Ibarra to assist with the search,
and noticed a "Whizzinator on the top of the bed with urine, so that was an indication of
a violation there." She explained that a Whizzinator is a device used "to falsify urine
samples." She did not find anything else of note in the room. (TrVol.I, p.19, L.15 p.22, L.17.)
Officer Ibarra then testified that Ms. Gomez asked him to "help assist her [in]
searching the house." He described his role in the search of the bedroom as follows,
I walked around the bed area and opened the dresser, and there was a
hat. And inside the hat there was a green jar. So I took the green jar out
of it, opened it up, and there was like white crystal substance inside of it
and a small bag of green, leafy stuff.
(TrVol.I, p.35, L.19 - p.36, L.2.) He conducted field tests of the two substances, which
came back presumptively positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. (Tr. Va 1.1 , p.36,
Ls.3-13.)
Following the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel submitted a brief in support of
the motion to suppress, the crux of which appears to be "that none of the information
[supporting reasonable suspicion] was ripe or fresh and that there was no current
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reasonable suspicion supporting the probation officers [sic] home visit."

(R., pp.38-41.)

At oral argument on the motion, defense counsel also asserted that the search was
improper because Mr. McDonald was not present when the search was conducted.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.51, L.8 - p.52, L.6.) The State conceded that Ms. McDonald had neither
actual nor apparent authority to consent to a search of Mr. McDonald's bedroom,
instead arguing that the search was appropriate because Ms. Gomez had reasonable
suspicion to justify conducting a search under the terms of the probation agreement.
(Tr.Vol.l, p.52, L.10 - p.55, L.3.)
In ruling on Mr. McDonald's motion to suppress, the district court identified the
relevant issue to be "whether Probation Officer Gomez had reasonable suspicion that
Defendant McDonald was violating the conditions of his probation and/or the Agreement
of Supervision at the time of the search at issue and whether the search was
reasonably related to confirmation of the suspected violation." (R., p.57.) In concluding
that such reasonable suspicion existed, the district court noted,
Gomez testified that, after two positive tests for methamphetamine in
January and February of 2011, she directed Mr. McDonald, on two
separate occasions in March and April, to enroll in cognitive self-change
treatment and Mr. McDonald failed to do so. In fact, Mr. McDonald
misrepresented to Probation Officer Gomez that he had made contact with
Canyon County's in-house treatment provider. Gomez learned, on April
15, 2011, that Mr. McDonald failed to comply with her second directive
that he enroll in treatment at 8ell Counseling. More importantly, on April
18, 2011, Gomez was notified that Mr. McDonald had attempted to falsify
his UA, using a device, on or about that date.
Officer Gomez made her visit to Defendant's residence on April 28, 2011,
in conjunction with her regularly-scheduled ride-along with the Caldwell
Police Department, within ten days of receiving notice that Mr. McDonald
had attempted to falsify his UA. The court concludes that this was not an
unreasonable amount of time. The ten-day period between Gomez's
receipt of notice and the search, standing alone, does not require the
conclusion that Gomez could not have possessed reasonable suspicion
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that the search of Mr. McDonald's room on April 18, 2011, would produce
evidence of a violation of Mr. McDonald's probation.
(R., p.58.)
Mr. McDonald then pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) conditioned on his ability to appeal from the denial of his motion to
suppress. 5 (Tr.vol.ll, p.2, L.20 - p.10, L.5.)

Ultimately, the district court imposed a

unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended in favor of four years of
probation.

(Tr.vol.ll, p.23, L.7 - p.24, L.11.) Mr. McDonald filed a Notice of Appeal

timely from entry of the judgment of conviction. (R., p.75.)

The plain language of Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (a)(2) requires that a conditional guilty
plea include a reservation of the right "in writing" specifying the "adverse ruling" from
which the appeal may be taken. It also requires the consent of the prosecuting
attorney. I.C.R. 11 (a)(2).
In this case, defense counsel failed to submit a reservation of the right in writing,
failed to specify the adverse ruling from which the appeal could be taken, and failed to
establish - on the record - that the prosecuting attorney consented to the conditional
guilty plea. (See Tr.vol.ll, p.2, L.20 - p.10, L.5.) Fortunately, the district court specified
the adverse ruling, and explained that it had "been noted for the record." (Tr.vol.ll, p.5,
Ls.10-16; Tr.vol.ll, p.20, Ls.17-20 ("[T]here was a motion to suppress and [we] had a
hearing on it, and I denied that motion. And you entered a conditional plea, reserving
your right to challenge the ruling.").)
With respect to the remaining deficiencies, Mr. McDonald notes that this Court
has held that lack of compliance with the writing requirement and a failure to secure the
express consent of the prosecutor on the record is not fatal on appeal, so long as "[i]t is
determinable with specificity that the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel entered
into [such] an agreement .... " State v. Anderson, 129 Idaho 763,764-65 (1997).
Nevertheless, defense counsel is wise to heed the Supreme Court's advice,
given in State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410 (2012), in which it explained "that the best
practice is to explicitly set forth the adverse rulings which are being reserved for appeal
in the conditional plea agreement. If the agreement lacks such specificity, there is a risk
that the appellate court will be unable to determine from the record what the parties
sought to reserve for appeal." Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 422.
5
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McDonald's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McDonald's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. McDonald asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress evidence discovered during the warrantless search of his bedroom because
his probation officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the search, as
required under the terms of his probation agreement, and because, due to the delay in
executing the search, the search was not reasonable.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but will freely review the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho
559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McDonald's Motion To Suppress
In this case, it is undisputed that the only potential exception to the warrant

requirement, upon which the search of Mr. McDonald's bedroom could be justified, was
the condition of his probation requiring him to permit a search "upon reasonable
suspicion to ensure compliance with the Agreement of Supervision."

(Tr.vol.l, p.52,

L.10 - p.55, L.3 (State conceding that Ms. McDonald had neither actual nor apparent
authority to consent to a search of Mr. McDonald's bedroom, and instead arguing that
the probation officer had reasonable suspicion to do so); State's Exhibit No.2.)
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A warrantless search is considered per se unreasonable under both the Idaho
and United States Constitutions, unless it falls under a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.

State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-97 (2006) (citing State v.

Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 640 (2003)). One such exception "is a nonconsensual search of
probationers and their property by probation or parole officers."

State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486 (2004)).

Id. at 497 (citing

The State bears the burden of

establishing the applicability of a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Anderson, 140 Idaho at 486.
"A probationer's home,

like anyone else's,

is protected

Amendment's requirement that searches be 'reasonable.'"
U.S. 868, 873 (1987).

by the

Fourth

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483

The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is not always

applicable, specifically in those situations involving "special needs" of the government.
Probation "is a 'special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon
privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. That permissible

Id. at 875.

degree is not unlimited, however . . . . "

"[W]e think it enough if the

information provided indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood ('had or might have
guns') of facts justifying the search."

Id. at 880.

"When an officer has reasonable

suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity,
there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable." United States v.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112,121 (2001).
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A reasonable suspicion determination involves an examination of "the 'totality of
the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer[6] has a
'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citation omitted).

"[T]he concept of reasonable

suspicion is somewhat abstract." Id. at 274 (citation omitted). "Articulating precisely
what 'reasonable suspicion' ... mean[s] is not possible." Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
The Indiana Court of Appeals has addressed what consideration to give to the
alleged staleness of information used to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Specifically, it has held that "instead of reviewing the purported staleness of the
information as a separate and independent factor ... the better approach is to assess
the age of the information as an element contributing to the totality of the
circumstances." Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Other
appellate courts have taken a similar approach. See, e.g., State v. Spillner, 173 P.3d
498, 508-09 (Haw. 2007); United States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th
Cir.2007).
In Cortez-Galaviz, the Tenth Circuit addressed the weight to be given the
timeliness of information when assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists to
support a traffic stop of a person known by the officer to have had his license
suspended recently. It explained why a period of several weeks between the last check

6 While this case deals with the legality of a detention, there is no reason to believe that
the definition of reasonable suspicion changes when it concerns a probation search.
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of the driver's license status and the stop was not fatal to a finding of reasonable
suspicion, explaining,
(TJimeliness of information is but one of many factors in the mix when
assessing whether reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention
exists, and the relative importance of timeliness in that mix depends on
the nature of the criminal activity at issue. Thus, for example, when the
legal infraction at issue typically wears on for days or weeks or months
(like, say, driving without a license or appropriate emissions and safety
certifications), rather than concludes quickly (like, say, jaywalking or
mugging), the timeliness of the information on which the government relies
to effect an investigative detention "recedes in importance" compared to
other factors, such as the type and duration of offense at issue.
Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1209 (internal citations omitted).
In the context of searches conducted pursuant to a parole condition, the Tenth
Circuit has concluded that such searches are justifiable without a warrant and upon only
reasonable suspicion because the ability of the supervising agent to act promptly is
crucial. Specifically, the Court reasoned, 'To adequately deter misconduct and protect
the public, parole agents must be permitted to act expeditiously upon reasonable
suspicion of a parole violation." United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 363 (10th Cir.
1995) (emphasis added).

The United States Supreme Court has explained that

dispensing with the warrant requirement for probation searches is constitutionallypermissible, in part, because "the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it
more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, and
would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would
otherwise create." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876 (internal citations omitted).
In Mr. McDonald's case, the information known to the probation officer - that he
had attempted to fake a urine test using a Whizzinator - was ten days old at the time of
the search. Furthermore, the probation officer did not explain whether she suspected
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that Mr. McDonald was still in possession of the Whizzinafor, or whether the staff at the
urine testing facility had confiscated the device upon its discovery. The probation officer
further failed to explain what evidence of a violation of his probation she suspected
would be found in Mr. McDonald's bedroom. Finally, the probation officer failed to act
expeditiously upon receipt of the information, choosing instead to wait until a regularlyscheduled ride-along with a police officer ten days later, and appeared to have engaged
in an open-ended, general search of Mr. McDonald's bedroom? Given the fact that a
key justification for allowing warrantless searches of probationers' homes based only on
reasonable suspicion is that prompt discovery of violations is essential in deterring
misconduct and protecting the community, the fact that the probation officer waited ten
days weighs heavily against a finding that the search in this case was reasonable.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. McDonald respectfully requests this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress,
and remand this matter to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
Mr. McDonald respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction
and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2012.

SPENcER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The apparently-unlimited scope of the search can be easily inferred from the testimony
of Officer Ibarra that he was asked by the probation officer to "help assist her in
searching the house." (Tr.vol.l, p.35, Ls.19-20.)
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